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Abstract
Machine-learning based intrusion detection classifiers are able to detect unknown attacks, but at the same
time they may be susceptible to evasion by obfuscation techniques. An adversary intruder which possesses a
crucial knowledge about a protection system can easily bypass the detection module. The main objective of our
work is to improve the performance capabilities of intrusion detection classifiers against such adversaries. To
this end, we firstly propose several obfuscation techniques of remote attacks that are based on the modification
of various properties of network connections; then we conduct a set of comprehensive experiments to evaluate
the effectiveness of intrusion detection classifiers against obfuscated attacks. We instantiate our approach
by means of a tool, based on NetEm and Metasploit, which implements our obfuscation operators on any
TCP communication. This allows us to generate modified network traffic for machine learning experiments
employing features for assessing network statistics and behavior of TCP connections. We perform evaluation
on five classifiers: Gaussian Naïve Bayes, Gaussian Naïve Bayes with kernel density estimation, Logistic
Regression, Decision Tree, and Support Vector Machines. Our experiments confirm the assumption that it
is possible to evade the intrusion detection capability of all classifiers trained without prior knowledge
about obfuscated attacks, causing an exacerbation of the TPR ranging from 7.8% to 66.8%. Further, when
widening the training knowledge of the classifiers by a subset of obfuscated attacks, we achieve a significant
improvement of the TPR by 4.21% – 73.3%, while the FPR is deteriorated only slightly (0.1% – 1.48%). Finally,
we test the capability of an obfuscations-aware classifier to detect unknown obfuscated attacks, where we
achieve over 90% detection rate on average for most of the obfuscations.
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1. Introduction
Network intrusion attacks such as exploiting unpatched
services continue to be one of the most dangerous
threats in the domain of information security [1], [2].
Due to an increasing sophistication in the techniques
used by attackers, misuse-based/knowledge-based [3]
∗Corresponding author. Email: ihomoliak@fit.vutbr.cz
intrusion detection suffers from undetected attacks
such as zero-day attacks or polymorphism, enabling
an exploit-code to avoid positive signature matching
of the packet payload data. Therefore, researchers and
developers are motivated to design new methods to
detect various versions of the modified network attacks
including the zero-day ones. These goals motivate
the popularity of Anomaly Detection Systems (ADS)
and also the classification approaches in the context
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of intrusion detection. Anomaly-based approaches are
based on building profiles of normal users and trying
to detect anomalies deviating from these profiles [3],
which might lead to detection of unknown intrusions,
but on the other hand it might also generate many false
positives. In contrast, the classification approaches take
advantage of both misuse-based and anomaly-based
models in order to leverage their respective advantages.
The classification detection methods firstly build a
model based on the labeled samples from both classes –
intrusions and the legitimate instances. Secondly, they
compare a new input to the model and select the more
similar class as the predicted label. Classification and
anomaly-based approaches are capable to detect some
unknown intrusions, but at the same time they may be
susceptible to evasion by obfuscation techniques.
Scope and Assumptions: Due to efficiency reasons
as well as pervasive encryption, we assume in this
work a classification-based network intrusion detection
system that does not perform deep packet inspection
and its model works with TCP connections objects,
not single packets. Also, we assume an adversary who
knows design details of such a system,1 but cannot
modify its training data. The adversary can only modify
the input of the system in a limited way that has
to conform the protocol specification of the TCP/IP
stack including victim’s application. The adversary can
achieve it in several ways: a modification of exploit
code, adding padding at the application layer of exploit
code, artificially influencing network or transport layer
protocols. If an adversary wants to take advantage
of huge database of existing exploits to make their
obfuscated mutations and massively exploit targets,
adding padding or various changes to exploit code, it
may be time consuming and unsustainable with newly
obtained exploits.2 Therefore, the easiest way for an
adversary is to design non-payload-based obfuscation
techniques working at network and transport layers,
which will mutate instances of known intrusions in an
exploit-independent way. This will make attacks similar
to a legitimate traffic. We follow this idea in our
paper and construct exploit-independent modifications
of attacks at network and transport layers of TCP/IP.
According to the taxonomy of adversarial attacks
against IDS [4], our adversarial approach belongs to
evasions of measurement phase of IDS. Considering
influence, security violation, and specificity as dimensions
of taxonomy of attacks against learning systems [5],
1Note that when designing a protection system, this kind of adversary
is stronger than adversary who does not know design details of a
protection system (i.e., Kerckhoffs’s principle).
2Note that the same holds for payload-based NIDS methods – they
need to spend a lot of effort to keep they database up-to-date with
millions of modified attack samples daily.
our obfuscated attacks belong to: 1) exploratory attacks,
which exploit misclassification but do not affect
training data, 2) integrity attacks, which compromise
assets via false negatives, and 3) indiscriminate attacks,
which compromise wide class of instances.
Despite the fact that non-payload-based evasions
and obfuscations of network attacks are not new
research topics [6], [7], [8], they are still challenging
subjects – to this date, this is witnessed by a few
citations of the Stonesoft’s technical report [9], which
for the first time successfully applied non-payload-
based obfuscations for existing network attacks. There
exist several related works considering non-payload-
based adversarial evasions of network attacks for
payload-based intrusion detection [7], [10], [11].
However, to the best of our knowledge, there are
no studies on non-payload-based intrusion detection
and obfuscation-based adversarial evasion (except our
previous research [12–14]).
Problem statement: In this work we address the
following questions:
• Is it possible to evade the detection of a non-
payload-based intrusion detection classifier by
obfuscation techniques?
• If so, is it possible to increase the resilience of such
a classifier against obfuscated attacks, or even
detect unknown ones?
Proposed Solution: To address this problem, we
define a set of obfuscation operators based on non-
payload-based modifications of connection-oriented
communications accomplished by NetEm utility [15]
and ifconfig command. Subsequently, we propose sev-
eral experiments to train a classifier using obfuscated
attacks as well as obfuscated legitimate connections and
compare it against another model of a classifier that is
unaware of obfuscated attacks.
Contributions: The main contributions of this paper
are as follows:
a) We define non-payload-based obfuscation tech-
niques and their influence on a classification task
in an intrusion detection classifier.
b) We implement several obfuscation techniques as
part of our obfuscation tool and later conduct
a data collection experiment that employs the
obfuscation tool.
c) We perform an evaluation of non-payload-based
obfuscation techniques using our dataset, and
we reveal them as: 1) successful in evading
detection by five classifiers that leverage selected
subset of network connection features designed
in [16], as well as 2) successful in an improvement
of evasion resistance of the classifiers against
unknown obfuscated attacks.
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d) Moreover, we elucidate an alternative view on
the outcome of our results, which is denoted as
training data driven approximation of a network
traffic normalizer.
e) The collected dataset is provided to the research
community.
2. Background
Consider a session of a protocol at the application
layer of the TCP/IP stack that serves for data transfer
between the client/server based application. The inter-
pretation of such application data exchanges between
client and server can be formulated, considering the
TCP/IP stack up to the transport layer, by connection k
that is constrained to connection oriented protocol TCP
at L4, Internet protocol IP at L3 and Ethernet protocol
at L2. The TCP connection k is represented by start and
end timestamps, ports of the client and the server, IP
addresses of the client and the server, sets of packets
sent by the client Pc, and by the server Ps, respectively.2.1. Features Extraction
At this time, we can express characteristics of a
TCP connection by network connection features. The
features extraction process is defined as a function that
maps a connection k into space of features F:
f (k) 7→ F,
F = (F1, F2, . . . , Fn),
(1)
where n represents the number of defined features.
Each function fi that extracts feature i is defined as a
mapping of a connection k into feature space Fi :
fi(k) 7→ Fi , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (2)
and each element3 of codomain Fi is defined as
e = (e0, . . . ,en), n ∈ N0,
ei ∈ N | ei ∈ R | ei ∈ Γ +, i ∈ {0, . . . , n},
Γ = {a − z, A − Z, 0 − 9},
(3)
where Γ + denotes positive iteration of the set Γ . In the
context of this work, examples of such features are show
in Table A.1 of Appendix.
2.2. Intrusion Detection Classification Task
Referring to [17], let X = V × Y be the space of labeled
samples,4 where V represents the space of unlabeled
samples and Y represents the space of possible labels.
3Representing a particular dimension of a feature.
4A sample refers to the vector of the network features extracted over
a connection.
Let Dtr = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a training dataset consisting
of n labeled samples, where xi = (vi ∈ V , yi ∈ Y ).
Consider classifier C which maps unlabeled sample v ∈
V to a label y ∈ Y :
y = C(v), (4)
and learning algorithm A which maps the given dataset
D to a classifier C:
C = A(Dtr ). (5)
The notation ypredict = A(Dtr , v) denotes the label
assigned to an unlabeled sample v by the classifier C,
build by learning algorithm A on the dataset Dtr . Now,
all extracted features of the connection k can be used
as an input of the trained classifier C that predicts the
target label:
ypredict = A
(
Dtr , f (k)
)
, (6)
where ypredict ∈ {Intrusion,Legitimate}.
3. Proposed Approach
Considering the background from the previous section,
now we describe non-payload-based obfuscations that
aim at modification of the behavioral characteristics of
a remote attack connection, and thus can influence the
outcome of the intrusion detection classification task.
3.1. Non-Payload-Based Obfuscations
Consider connection ka representing a remote attack
communication executed without any obfuscation.
Then, ka can be represented by features
f (ka) 7→ Fa = (Fa1, Fa2, . . . , Fan), (7)
which are delivered to the previously trained classifier
C. Assume that C can correctly predict the target label
as an intrusive one, because its knowledge base is
derived from training dataset Dtr containing intrusive
connections having similar (or the same) behavioral
characteristics.
Now, consider connection k′a which represents
intrusive communication ka executed by employment of
non-payload-based obfuscations aimed at modification
of its network behavioral properties. The obfuscations
can modify the Pc and Ps packet sets of the original
connection ka by insertion, removal and transformation
of the packets. The modifications of Pc and Ps of
the connection ka can cause alteration of the original
features’ values Fa to new ones. Thus, features extracted
over k′a are represented by
f (k′a) 7→ Fa′ = (Fa′1 , Fa
′
2 , . . . , F
a′
n ) (8)
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Figure 1. Behavioral state diagram of the obfuscation tool
and have different values than features Fa of the connec-
tion ka. Therefore, we conjecture that the likelihood of a
correct prediction of k′a-connection’s features Fa
′
by the
previously assumed classifier C is lower than in the case
of connection ka. Also, we conjecture that classifier C′
trained by learning algorithm A on training dataset D ′tr ,
containing some obfuscated intrusion instances, will be
able to correctly predict higher number of unknown
obfuscated intrusions than classifier C. These assump-
tions will be evaluated and analyzed later.
3.2. Obfuscation Tool
We designed a tool that morphs network characteristics
of a TCP connection at network and transport layers
of the TCP/IP stack by applying one or a combination
of several non-payload-based obfuscation techniques.
Execution of direct communications (non-obfuscated
ones) is also supported by the tool as well as
capturing network traffic related to a communication.
The tool is capable of automatic/semi-automatic run
and restoring of all modified system settings and
consequences of attacks/legitimate communications on
a target machine. After the successful execution of each
desired obfuscation on the selected service, the output
contains several network packet traces associated with
pertaining obfuscations. The behavioral state diagram
of the obfuscation tool is depicted in Figure 1.
3.3. Description of Data Collection
We applied the obfuscation tool for a specific set
of vulnerable network services and obtained samples
of network packet traces related to malicious as
well as legitimate communications executed with the
employment of particular obfuscations in a virtual
network environment. Also, we collected network
traffic samples of direct attacks for each vulnerable
service. These network packet traces were passed to a
feature extraction process that first identified all TCP
connections and then extracted features per each TCP
connection. The collection of these TCP connection-
based feature vectors is referred to as dataset, which is
analyzed in further machine learning experiments.
3.4. Description of Machine Learning Experiments
We performed several classification experiments in
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
obfuscation techniques as well as feedback of a classifier
having obfuscated data included in its training process.
All of our experiments considered two class prediction,
discerning between legitimate and malicious TCP
connections. Therefore, obfuscated and direct attacks
were represented by the same class. We executed the
following experiments:
• For the purpose of finding the best subset of
network connection features, we ran the Forward
Feature Selection (FFS) method. FFS started to
run with an empty set of features and in each
iteration executing cross validation, it added a
new feature contributing by the best improvement
of average recall of all classes. In order to alleviate
the possibility of the selection process becoming
4 EAI Endorsed Transactions Preprint
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Technique Parametrized Instance ID
Spread out packets
in time
• constant delay: 1s (a)
• constant delay: 8s (b)
• normal distribution of delay with 5s mean 2.5s standard deviation (25%
correlation)
(c)
Packets’ loss • 25% of packets (d)
Unreliable network
channel simulation
• 25% of packets damaged (e)
• 35% of packets damaged (f)
• 35% of packets damaged with 25% correlation (g)
Packets’ duplication • 5% of packets (h)
Packets’ order
modifications
• reordering of 25% packets; reordered packets are sent with 10ms delay and
50% correlation
(i)
• reordering of 50% packets; reordered packets are sent with 10ms delay and
50% correlation
(j)
Fragmentation
•MTU 1000 (k)
•MTU 750 (l)
•MTU 500 (m)
•MTU 250 (n)
Combinations
• normal distribution delay (µ = 10ms, σ = 20ms) and 25% correlation; loss: 23%
of packets; corrupt: 23% of packets; reorder: 23% of packets
(o)
• normal distribution delay (µ = 7750ms, σ = 150ms) and 25% correlation;
loss: 0.1% of packets; corrupt: 0.1% of packets; duplication: 0.1% of packets;
reorder: 0.1% of packets
(p)
• normal distribution delay (µ = 6800ms, σ = 150ms) and 25% correlation; loss:
1% of packets; corrupt: 1% of packets; duplication: 1% of packets; reorder 1% of
packets
(q)
Table 1. Experimental obfuscation techniques with parameters and IDs
stuck in local extremes, we allowed acceptance of
one iteration without improvement.
• Considering the selected subset of features, we
evaluated evasion resistance of a classifier trained
on direct attacks and legitimate traffic only, while
testing was performed on the whole dataset
including obfuscated attacks.
• Next, we widened the knowledge of a classifier by
adding some obfuscated attacks into the training
set and compared its evasion resistance with the
previous case.
• Another experiment tested capability of the
classifier to detect unknown obfuscated attacks by
customized leave-one-out validation.
• Finaly, we analyzed the success rate of evasion per
particular vulnerable service.
4. Implementation
The proposed obfuscation techniques had been instan-
tiated as part of the obfuscation tool designed and
implemented in the Unix environment. Parametrized
instances of these techniques (introduced in our previ-
ous work [18]) are presented in Table 1. The selection of
particular obfuscation techniques was primarily moti-
vated by the need for achieving divergent behavior of
obfuscated network attacks as well as by capabilities
of Unix OS. We experimented with various parameters’
values with the intention to cover a wide range of diver-
gent behaviors and, moreover, for the case of attacks,
preserve the exploitation successful.5 The methodology
presented in this paper allows for a straightforward
extension of the proposed obfuscation set.
4.1. Implementation Notes and Setup
The obfuscation tool is based on open source tools
and is written in the Python and Ruby programming
languages. For the purpose of an automatic attack
execution an utility from Metasploit framework was
used. Tcpdump tool was chosen to perform network
traffic capture between the attacker’s machine and
vulnerable one. Most obfuscations were carried out
by Linux tc utility and its extension NetEm [15],
respectively. NetEm enabled us to add latency of
packets, loss of packets, duplication of packets,
reordering of packets, and other outgoing traffic
characteristics of the selected network interface. The
modification of MTU was performed by the Linux
utility ifconfig.
We established a virtual network environment for
vulnerability exploitation, where all virtual machines
5Note that some obfuscations or their combinations may cause an
attack to fail, therefore we filtered out such combinations.
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Figure 2. Comparison of direct and obfuscated attacks on Samba service
(VMs) were configured with private static IP addresses
in order to enable easy automation of the whole
exploitation process. Our testing network infrastruc-
ture consisted of the attacker’s machine equipped with
Kali Linux and vulnerable machines that were running
Metasploitable 1, 2,6 and Windows XP with SP 3.
4.2. Vulnerable Services
For proof-of-concept purpose, we aimed at selection
of vulnerable services with the high severity of their
successful exploitation leading to remote shell code
execution through an established backdoor communi-
cation. Although there exist plethora of publicly avail-
able exploit-codes for contemporary vulnerabilities, the
situation with corresponding available vulnerable SW
is different due to understandable prevention reasons.
Therefore, we selected older available high-severity
vulnerable services that are outdated but may serve
as a demonstration of our approach. The following
listing contains an enumeration of vulnerable services
involved in our experiments, complemented by brief
description of their exploitation:
a) Apache Tomcat: – firstly, a dictionary attack was
executed in order to obtain access credentials into
the application manager instance. Further, the
server’s application manager was exploited for
transmission and execution of malicious code.
6https://information.rapid7.com/metasploitable-download.
html
b) Microsoft SQL Server: – a dictionary attack
was employed to obtain access credentials of
MSSQL user and then the procedure xp_cmdshell
enabling the execution of an arbitrary code was
exploited.
c) Samba service: – vulnerability in Samba service
enabled the attacker of arbitrary command
execution, which exploited MS-RPC functionality
when configuration username map script was
allowed. There was no need of authentication in
this attack.
d) Server service of Windows: – the service enabled
the attacker of arbitrary code execution through
crafted RPC request resulting into stack overflow
during path canonicalization.
e) PostgreSQL database: – a dictionary attack was
executed in order to obtain access credentials into
the PostgreSQL instance. Standard PostgreSQL
Linux installation had write access to /tmp
directory and it could call user defined functions
(UDF) that utilized shared libraries located on an
arbitrary path (e.g., /tmp). An attacker exploited
this fact and copied its own UDF code to /tmp
directory and then executed it.
f) DistCC service: – vulnerability enabled the
attacker remote execution of an arbitrary com-
mand through compilation jobs that were exe-
cuted on the server without any permission check.
An example of a TCP sequence diagram comparing
direct and obfuscated attacks on Samba service is
depicted in Figure 2, where each arrow contains the
6 EAI Endorsed Transactions Preprint
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Network Service Count of TCP Connections
Legitimate Direct Attacks Obfuscated
Attacks
Summary
Apache Tomcat 809 61 163 1033
DistCC 100 12 23 135
MSSQL 532 31 103 666
PostgreSQL 737 13 45 795
Samba 4641 19 44 4704
Server 3339 26 100 3465
Other Legitimate
Traffic
647 N/A N/A 647
Summary 10805 162 478 11445
Table 2. Distribution of TCP connection objects in collected dataset
timestamp of send event and short description with
the size of transmitted data. TCP handshakes and end-
shakes are represented by dashed arrows, exploitation
of a vulnerability is depicted in red. The new and
different transmissions of obfuscated attack against
direct one are depicted in blue, while another difference
can be seen in values of transmission time. These
changes were caused by obfuscation (o) that generated
a loss of one or more SYN/ACK packets at the 3-way
handshake phase, loss of ACK packet after SMB Request
and also addition of delay into delivery of all packets.4.3. Collected Network Traffic Dataset
We applied our obfuscation tool for automatic exploita-
tion of the enumerated vulnerable services using the
proposed obfuscations. The captured related mali-
cious network traffic, which we further passed to
TCP connection-level feature extractor [16]. When an
exploitation leading to a remote shell was successful,
simulated attackers performed simple activities involv-
ing various shell commands (such as listing directo-
ries, opening and reading files). The average number
of issued commands was around 10 and text files of
up to 50kB were opened/read. Note that we labeled
each TCP connection representing dictionary attacks as
legitimate ones due to two reasons: 1.) from the behav-
ioral point of view, they independently appeared just
as unsuccessful authentication attempts, which may
occur in legitimate traffic as well, 2.) more importantly,
we employed ASNM features whose subset involves
context of an analyzed TCP connection for their com-
putation – i.e., ASNM features capture relations to other
TCP connections initiated from/to a corresponding ser-
vice. On the other hand, legitimate network traffic was
collected from two sources:
a) Common usage of all previously mentioned
services was obtained in an annonymized form,
excluding the payload, from a real campus
network with accordance to policies in force.
Analyzing packet headers, we observed that
a lot of expected legitimate traffic contained
malicious activity, as many students did not
care about up-to-date software. Therefore, we
filtered out network connections yielding high
and medium severity alerts by signature-based
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) –
Suricata and Snort – through Virus Total API [19].
b) The second source represented legitimate traffic
simulation in our virtual network architecture
and also employed all of our non-payload-
based obfuscations for the purpose of partially
addressing overstimulation in adversarial attacks
against IDS [4], and thus making the classification
task more challenging. However, only 109 TCP
connections were obtained from this stage,
which was also caused by the fact that services
such as Server and DistCC were hard to
emulate.7 Simulation of legitimate traffic was
aimed at various SELECT and INSERT statements
when interacting with the database services
(i.e., PostgreSQL, MSSQL); several GET and
POST queries to our custom pages as well
as downloading of high volume data when
interacting with our HTTP server (i.e., Apache
Tomcat); and several queries for downloading and
uploading small files into Samba share.
The final dataset is summarized in Table 2 and
is also available from http://www.fit.vutbr.cz/
~ihomoliak/asnm/ASNM-NPBO.html.
5. Evaluation
All machine learning experiments were performed in
Rapid Miner Studio [20] using five different classifiers:
two with parametric models – Gaussian Naïve Bayes
7Note that additionally to those 109 TCP connections that were
explicitly simulated, other 2252 TCP connections from obfuscated
dictionary attacks were also considered as legitimate, and thus also
helped in achieving a resistance against the overstimulation attacks.
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Classifier TPR FPR F1 (↑) Avg. Recall
N. Bayes (kernels) 98.15% 0.02% 98.45% 99.07%
Decision Tree 95.68% 0.09% 94.80% 97.80%
SVM 82.72% 0.01% 90.24% 91.36%
Log. Regression 70.99% 0.20% 76.92% 85.40%
N. Bayes 97.53% 8.14% 26.33% 94.70%Table 3. Direct attacks and legitimate traffic cross validation
and Logistic Regression; and three with nonparametric
models – Gaussian Naïve Bayes with kernel density
estimation, SVM with radial kernel function, and
Decision Tree with maximal depth of 10 levels. Note
that parametric models make assumptions about the
data, which means that they use a finite set of
parameters for modeling the data. This makes them
simple and fast, but on the other hand they are
not flexible in modeling of data that do not contain
their assumed distribution. In contrast to them, non-
parametric models have no assumptions about the
data, and thus they may use unlimited number of
parameters. The advantage of these models is their
flexibility, but on the other hand they may overfit the
training data. Across all of our experiments, network
connection features were instantiated by FFS-selected
subset of ASNM features (e.g., Table A.1), whose
full list is available in Appendix D of [14]. Note
that some features of ASNM may lead to overfitting
of training data due to laboratory conditions of
VMs’ setup where attacks were executed. Therefore,
such features were removed from the dataset in the
preprocessing phase of our experiments and consist
of TTL-based features, IP addresses, ports, MAC
addresses, occurrence of source/destination host in
monitored network. Considering our current dataset’s
class distribution, we decided to select 5-fold cross
validation, which creates big enough folds for binary
classification. All cross validation experiments have
been adjusted to employ stratified sampling during
assembling of folds, which ensured equally balanced
class distribution of each fold.
5.1. Forward Feature Selection
The experiment consisted of two executions of the FFS
per each classifier. In each of executions, we optimized
a few important parameters of the classifiers using grid
approach. In the cases of both Naïve Bayes classifiers,
we enabled Laplace correction in order to prevent
models from high influence by zero probabilities of
some values, and moreover in the kernel-based version
we optimized the bandwidth of kernels. In SVM, we
optimized: 1) parameter C that represents trade-off
between a soft and hard boundary of the hyperplane
and 2) parameter gamma of the Gaussian radial kernel
that influences the variance of the Gaussian kernel. The
(a) Obfuscated attacks
Classifier TPR (↑) ∆ TPR
N. Bayes 81.80% -13.26%
Log. Regression 63.18% -7.81%
N. Bayes (kernels) 52.30% -45.85%
Decision Tree 36.61% -59.07%
SVM 15.90% -66.82%
(b) All attacks
Classifier TPR (↑) ∆ TPR
N. Bayes 86.09% -8.97%
Log. Regression 66.25% -4.74%
N. Bayes (kernels) 64.38% -33.77%
Decision Tree 52.03% -43.65%
SVM 26.25% -56.47%
Table 4. Prediction of obfuscated/all attacks by classifierstrained without knowledge about obfuscated attacks
regularization parameter lambda was optimized in the
case of Logistic Regression – the parameter controls
overfitting of the model at the expense of incorporating
the bias. And finally, in the case of the decision tree, we
used gain ratio as a criterion for selection of attributes
for splitting, while we optimized minimal gain required
for splitting, which controls the number of splits.
The first execution set of FFS took as input just legiti-
mate traffic and direct attack entries, and represented
the case where intrusion detection classifiers were
trained without knowledge about obfuscated attacks.
We denote the selected features as FFS DL (Direct +
Legitimate). The second execution set took as input
the whole dataset of network traffic – consisting of
legitimate traffic, direct attacks as well as obfuscated
ones, and thus represented the case where classifiers
were aware of obfuscated attacks. Here, we denote the
selected features as FFS DOL (Direct + Obfuscated +
Legitimate). We assume FFS DL features set as less
informed (and thus less tuned) than FFS DOL features,
therefore when FFS DL features are used, we assume
that classifiers do not have knowledge about obfuscated
attacks, while FFS DOL features are used when we
assume the opposite case. Both FFS-selected feature sets
are presented in Table A.1 of Appendix (columns FFS
DOL and FFS DL).
5.2. Evasion of Intrusion Detection Classifiers
A 5-fold cross validation was performed using direct
attacks with legitimate traffic using FFS DL features.
The performance measures of the classifiers validated
by cross validation are shown in Table 3. Then the
classifiers trained on all direct attacks and legitimate
traffic instances were applied for the prediction of
the obfuscated attacks and all attacks, respectively
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(a) FFS DL features
Classifier TPR FPR
∆
TPR
∆
FPR F1(↑)
Avg.
Recall
N. Bayes (kernels) 93.28% 0.73% +28.90% +0.71% 90.73% 96.28%
SVM 80.31% 0.05% +54.06% +0.04% 88.70% 90.13%
Log. Regression 74.69% 0.33% +20.00% +0.13% 82.85% 87.18%
Decision Tree 67.34% 0.36% +15.31% +0.27% 77.65% 83.49%
N. Bayes 60.31% 1.87% -34.07% -6.27% 62.87% 79.22%
(b) FFS DOL features
Classifier TPR FPR
∆
TPR
∆
FPR F1(↑)
Avg.
Recall
SVM 99.53% 0.13% +73.28% +0.12% 98.68% 99.70%
Decision Tree 98.44% 0.19% +46.41% +0.10% 97.60% 99.13%
N. Bayes (kernels) 98.75% 0.99% +34.37% +0.97% 91.66% 98.88%
Log. Regression 97.50% 1.68% +31.25% +1.48% 86.37% 97.91%
N. Bayes 98.59% 3.75% +4.21% -4.39% 75.30% 97.42%
Table 5. Whole dataset cross validation
(see Table 4). Here TPRs were deteriorated for all
classifiers, which means that some obfuscated attacks
were successful – they were predicted as legitimate
traffic, and thus caused evasion of the classifiers.
Note that in the case of direct attacks and
legitimate traffic cross validation, non-parametric
classifiers achieved better performance than parametric
classifiers, while in the case of obfuscated attacks
non-parametric classifiers were more significantly
deteriorated in TPR, which was caused by their
property of overfitting known data.
5.3. Widening the Knowledge of the Classifiers
In order to improve the resistance of the classifiers
against evasions, we widened their knowledge about
different mixtures of obfuscated attack instances, which
was accomplished by random 5-fold cross validation
of the whole dataset. In this experiment, it is justified
to use FFS DOL features that consider knowledge
about obfuscated attacks for updating not only the
model of a classifier but also underlying feature set.
Additionally, we show the results with FFS DL features,
which consider updating model only. The results of this
experiment are shown in Table 5. Comparing against
the results from the previous experiment (see FPRs
from Table 3 and TPRs from Table 4b), most of the
classifiers were significantly improved in TPR, while
FPR was deteriorated only slightly. This confirms the
fulfilled assumption that the classifiers trained with
knowledge about some obfuscated attacks are able to
detect the same and similar obfuscated attacks. The
only exception is the Gaussian Naïve Bayes classifier
that updates model only, not the underlying feature set
(Table 5a). Here is important to note that this classifier
makes strong assumptions about the modeled data and
when we searched for the optimal feature set with
direct and legitimate traffic (FFS DL), it was unable to
further optimize FPR, which remained high in contrast
to other classifiers. Therefore, when obfuscated attacks
were added into the cross validation, the classifier was
unable to use the same features and the same strong
assumptions about the original data for fitting the
different data. However, in the case of updating the
feature set (Table 5b), both TPR and FPR of the classifier
were improved.
5.4. Detection of Unknown Obfuscated Attacks
For the purpose of explicitly testing the classifiers’
capability to detect new kinds of obfuscated attacks, we
performed customized leave-one-out validation using
FFS DOL features, where the classifier was step-
by-step trained on all permutations of the whole
dataset excluding only obfuscated attack samples
created by a single obfuscation technique, or its
instance, respectively; while it was validated on the
excluded part of the dataset. Table 6 presents ordered
ratios of correctly detected unknown obfuscated
attacks per obfuscation technique as well as per
its instance. Comparing detection performance of
unknown obfuscated attacks, either per instance or
per obfuscation technique, we concluded that in
most of the obfuscations, there were achieved high
detection rates that indicate the acceptable resistance
of the obfuscations-aware classifiers against unknown
obfuscated attacks. The only exceptions are obfuscation
techniques that modify MTU. This can be explained
by the fact that the majority of the features employed
in our experiments is mostly sensitive to packet
lengths, which are influenced by fragmentation-based
obfuscations. This phenomenon is more significant
in the cases of non-parametric classifiers due to
their property of overfitting the training data. In
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(a) 28 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(b) 22 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(j) 27 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(p) 33 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
(c) 30 96.67% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.33%
(i) 27 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 96.30% 100.00% 99.26%
(e) 26 100.00% 100.00% 96.15% 100.00% 100.00% 99.23%
(g) 26 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 96.15% 99.23%
(d) 30 100.00% 100.00% 96.67% 96.67% 100.00% 98.67%
(h) 30 100.00% 100.00% 96.67% 96.67% 100.00% 98.67%
(q) 35 100.00% 97.14% 97.14% 97.14% 100.00% 98.29%
(m) 27 92.59% 100.00% 92.59% 100.00% 100.00% 97.04%
(o) 28 100.00% 92.86% 92.86% 100.00% 96.43% 96.43%
(f) 28 92.86% 96.43% 92.86% 100.00% 96.43% 95.71%
(l) 27 81.48% 100.00% 92.59% 100.00% 100.00% 94.81%
(k) 27 66.67% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 93.33%
(n) 27 70.37% 77.78% 48.15% 55.56% 74.07% 65.19%
Average 94.15% 97.89% 94.45% 96.61% 97.83%
Std. Dev. ±10.81% ±5.54% ±12.30% ±10.68% ±6.29%
(b) Per technique
Unknown
Obfuscation
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(a, b, c) 80 98.75% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 99.75%
(i, j) 54 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 94.44% 100.00% 98.89%
(d) 30 100.00% 100.00% 96.67% 96.67% 100.00% 98.67%
(h) 30 100.00% 100.00% 96.67% 96.67% 100.00% 98.67%
(o, p, q) 96 100.00% 96.88% 96.88% 96.88% 98.96% 97.92%
(e, f, g) 80 97.50% 98.75% 95.00% 100.00% 97.50% 97.75%
(k, l, m, n) 108 75.93% 92.59% 83.33% 61.11% 93.52% 81.30%
Average 96.03% 98.32% 95.51% 92.25% 98.57%
Std. Dev. ±8.91% ±2.78% ±5.68% ±13.87% ±2.41%
Table 6. Ratios of correctly detected unknown obfuscated attacks
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Apache 163 55.21% 4.91% 55.83% 88.34% 93.87% 59.63%
PostgreSQL 45 66.67% 0.00% 88.89% 100.00% 0.00% 51.11%
MSSQL 103 18.45% 23.30% 71.84% 100.00% 12.62% 45.24%
Samba 44 70.45% 0.00% 50.00% 100.00% 2.27% 44.55%
DistCC 23 39.13% 17.39% 95.65% 47.83% 17.39% 43.48%
Server 100 49.00% 0.00% 54.00% 44.00% 5.00% 30.40%
Average 49.82% 7.60% 69.37% 80.03% 21.86%
Std. Dev. 19.17% 10.23% 19.35% 26.84% 35.88%Table 7. Successfully obfuscated attacks (evasions) per service
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general, parametric classifiers were more successful in
detecting unknown obfuscated attacks and their correct
predictions were more stable than in non-parametric
classifiers. However, in the case of one parametric
classifier – Gaussian Naïve Bayes – we also have to take
into account its worse FPR in comparison to Logistic
Regression (shown in Table 3).
5.5. Successful Evasions per Service
This experiment compares and analyzes success rate of
evasion per vulnerable service. The results presented
here originate from a binary classification experiment
in which the classifier was trained without obfuscated
attacks and validated on the whole dataset (Table 4)
using FFS DL features. The obfuscations are considered
successful if they are predicted as legitimate traffic;
the situation represents evasion case. Ordered ratios of
successfully obfuscated attacks per service are present
in Table 7. The minimum achieved ratios of attacks
that evaded detection are shown in bold and belong
to parametric classifiers, which was already mentioned
above. Most successful obfuscated attacks are those
exploiting Apache service. From a detailed analysis
of this service, we found out that instances of direct
attacks had very flat value distribution of many features
in comparison to other direct attacks. Examples of such
features are the standard deviation of inbound and
outbound packet sizes of the connection, and other
features dependent on the packets’ length variability.
Therefore, obfuscated attacks caused more variability
of the features that were in many cases similar to
legitimate traffic. On the other hand, in the cases of
Server, many features of the direct attacks were more
divergent across their instances, and thus obfuscations
contributed to the divergence only in a low scale.
Therefore, most of the obfuscated attacks had similar
characteristics like direct ones, which enabled their
detection.
6. Discussion
Impact of Obfuscations on Feature Divergence. To
assess the impact of proposed obfuscations on the
divergence of ASNM features, we compared values of
each FFS-selected feature of obfuscated attacks with
feature values obtained from direct attacks executed
with the same exploit. In other words, we quantified
the change that obfuscations bring by computing the
ratio of divergent single-feature obfuscated attacks
against the closest single-feature direct attack using
the same exploit on the same service. We found out
that this ratio (averaged per all FFS DL features) is
higher than 55% in the case of all classifiers, which can
be viewed as the proposed obfuscations were able to
influence the majority of features in obfuscated attacks.
The example of this ratio computed per each input
feature of Gaussian Naïve Bayes classifier is presented
in Table A.1 (the last column). Note that in the case of
FFS DOL features, the average of this ratio per-feature
is lower (66.33%) than in the case of FFS DL features
(72.80%), as FFS DOL was aware of obfuscations and
thus selected more obfuscation-resistant features.
Retraining. Although we had demonstrated that our
adversarial classification approach to network intrusion
detection can detect unknown obfuscated attacks
with high performance, it is still possible to design
and apply unknown network connection morphing
techniques to bypass the detection. In order to keep
this performance as high as possible, retraining of
the classifier should be performed each time a new
form of obfuscation is known to occur. However, such
retraining of generative classifiers (both Naïve Bayes
classifiers) relates to sub-model of the malicious class
only, and therefore is faster than retraining monolithic
models of discriminative classifiers such as SVM, decision
tree, and logistic regression, where the whole model
incorporating both classes has to be retrained. This
favors generative classifiers over discriminative when
a frequent update of a model is required. On the
other hand, retraining of the legitimate sub-model of
generative classifiers should be also performed once
in a while in order to ensure that all new manners
of using particular services are captured. Next aspect
related to fast retraining of classifiers is whether they
can be retrained with preserving the feature set and still
provide high performance. From this point of view, we
have found Naïve Bayes with Gaussian kernels as the
most convenient classifier (see results in Table 5a).
Extension of Obfuscations. Our obfuscations are
not exhaustive but cover a wide range of network
connection morphing possibilities that can influence
the detection performance of a non-payload-based
intrusion detection classifier. On the other hand, the
methodology presented in this paper allows for a
straightforward extension of the obfuscations.
High Rate of Attacks. Our dataset has the ratio of
malicious to legitimate connections equal to 5.9%,
while in practice this ratio is usually several orders of
magnitude lesser. Although an arbitrary value of this
ratio does not distort the performance of the classifier
when correct performance measure is chosen (e.g.,
F1-measure, average recall of classes), it might impact
the accuracy of modeling the legitimate class whose
high volume occurred in practice can result in high
divergence of data, which might not be captured by
models built from our dataset in sufficient manner.
Therefore in practice, classifiers would require much
more legitimate data than in our dataset.
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Normalizers. If we would assume the existence of
optimal network normalizer that would be able to
completely eliminate the impact of proposed non-
payload-based obfuscation techniques, then these
obfuscation techniques would be useless. Nevertheless,
if such optimal network normalizer would exist, then
it would be still prone to state holding and CPU
overload attacks [21], [22], [23]. Contrary, if we would
not assume network normalizer as part of our system,
then non-payload-based obfuscation techniques might
be employed as training data driven approximation
of network normalizer that would not be prone to
previously mentioned attacks. The situation can be
demonstrated by our binary classification experiments
(Section 5.2). Consider intrusion detection classifier
validated on direct attacks and legitimate traffic
whose average recall is higher than 90% for each
classifier (Table 3). Here training and testing data of
the classifier were built upon normalized malicious
network traffic represented by direct attacks. Then,
the model trained on the direct attacks and legitimate
traffic was applied to prediction of the obfuscated
attacks. In this case, obfuscated attacks may represent
un-normalized malicious network traffic, and thus
the classifier achieved worse performance than in the
previous case: TPR was significantly decreased while
FPR was preserved from the previous step (Table 4a).
In order to alleviate negative performance impact of
un-normalized malicious network traffic (represented
by obfuscated attacks) on our system, we can include
obfuscated attacks in the training process of the
classifier. This case is interpreted by performance
measured contained in Table 5b. There was achieved
average recall over 97% for each classifier, primarily
thanks to significant improvement of TPR in most of the
classifiers. Thus, as an alternative outcome of our work,
a network normalizer element may be omitted from
classification-based intrusion detection infrastructure
and can be approximated by appropriate training data.
7. Related Work
Using taxonomy of attacks against learning systems [5],
we categorize our approach to the class of exploratory
indiscriminate attacks violating integrity via false nega-
tives. The same class of attacks was addressed for exam-
ple in the field of spam filtering [24], [25], malware detec-
tion [24], payload-based anomaly intrusion detection [26],
[27], automatic speech recognition [28], etc. However, to
the best of our knowledge, this class of attacks had not
been studied in the non-payload-based intrusion detection
yet, including anomaly-based and classification-based
approaches. Further, we aim at related work of eva-
sive adversarial attacks against IDS, and we divide it
into payload-based and non-payload-based approaches,
plus their combination. Additionally, papers dealing
with network traffic normalization are also described.
Payload-based Evasions. The first work dealing with
payload-based evasions is described in [8] and presents
a tool called Whisker. The author aims at anti-intrusion
detection tactics by performing mutations of the HTTP
request in a way that a web server is able to understand
the request, but intrusion detection systems can be
confused. Vigna et al. [29] proposed a framework
generating exploit mutations to change the appearance
of a malicious payload bypassing detection of NIDS.
The proposed framework was evaluated on two well-
known signature-based NIDSs – Snort and RealSecure.
A similar approach was proposed by Fogla et al. [26]
in their polymorphic blending attacks that change the
payload of a network worm in order to look normal, and
thus effectively evade a byte frequency-based anomaly
NIDS. Other approaches use many different techniques
for evading detection by changing the payload, e.g.,
obfuscation techniques such as malware morphism [30]
and other attack tactics against IDSs [4]. All of these
adversarial approaches are similar to our approach, but
in contrast they deal only with evasions of payload-
based NIDSs.
Non-payload-based Evasions. Previous methods can
evade payload-based NIDS systems primarily by
morphing the payload, but do not need to be
efficient against non-payload-based network intrusion
detectors, which are most sensitive on the attack
morphing at the network and transport layers of the
TCP/IP stack. Fragroute [7] is a tool that was written to
test intrusion detection systems by using simple ruleset
language enabling interception and modification of
egress traffic with minimal support for randomized
or probabilistic behavior. Fragroute implements three
classes of attacks – insertion, evasion, and denial of
service. AGENT [10] uses several methods of altering
network traffic by packet splitting, duplicate insertions,
etc. Watson et al. [11] proposed a method called
Protocol Scrubbing that represents active mechanisms
for transparent removing of network attacks from
protocol layers in order to allow passive IDS systems to
operate correctly against evasion techniques. Wright et
al. [31] proposed thwarting of network traffic classifiers
by optimally morphing one class of traffic to look like
another class with respect to a given set of features,
while they employ padding or splitting the data into
smaller parts. This is similar to our approach, but in
contrast the authors aim at network traffic classification
in general, rather than intrusion detection. An example
of evasion that deals with tunneling of malicious
network traffic in payload of HTTP(S) protocol is
presented in [12] and [13]. Although the authors do
evasion of payload-based NIDS as well, the main focus
of the work is the evasion of non-payload-based NIDS.
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Combinations. Evasions based on modifications at
each of the application, transport and network layers of
the TCP/IP stack are described in [32] and [33]. Cheng
et al. [32] described general evasion techniques and
examined the detection performance of signature-based
NIDS when performing mutation of known attacks.
Juan et al. described framework called idsprobe [33]
that is intended for evasion-resilience testing of
NIDSs. Idsprobe can perform offline as well as live
evasion test cases, while it supports payload-based and
non-payload-based modifications of network attacks
according to predefined transformation profiles. The
authors of idsprobe differ from our approach in
two points: 1.) they aim at payload-based intrusion
detection, 2.) their test cases involve evasions at
application layer of ISO/OSI.
Normalizers. In order to answer non-payload-based
evasions of NIDS, the concept of network traffic nor-
malizer was introduced by Handley et al. [6]. The
authors proposed the implementation of normalizer
called norm. Norm performs normalizations of ambigu-
ities in the TCP traffic stream that can be seen by NIDS.
However, introducing a network normalization brought
problems related to platform dependent semantic of
network ambiguities interpretation as well as through-
put reduction. These problems lead Shankar et al. [34]
to introduce the concept and implementation of Active
Mapping, which eliminates them with minimal run-
time cost by building profiles of the network topology
including the TCP/IP policies of hosts on the network.
A NIDS may then use the host profiles to disambiguate
the interpretation of the network traffic on a per-host
basis. However, because of the shortcomings of network
normalizers, their usage in a network can result in side-
effects and can even be prone to various attacks, e.g.,
state holding, and CPU overload [21], [22], [23].
8. Conclusion
The motivation behind our work is to strengthen
non-payload-based intrusion detection classifiers in
an attack-independent way, assuming an adversary
who can massively mutate known exploits to attack
huge amount of targets. With this in mind, we exe-
cuted remote attacks and legitimate communications
on selected vulnerable network services while utiliz-
ing various non-payload-based obfuscation techniques
based on NetEm and MTU modifications with the inten-
tion to make behavioral characteristics of the attacks
being similar to those of legitimate traffic, and thus
cause evasion of our experimental non-payload-based
intrusion detection classifiers. The summary of the pre-
sented results revealed non-payload-based obfuscation
techniques as partially successful in evading detec-
tion by five classifiers (two parametric and three non-
parametric), which were trained without prior knowl-
edge about them. On the other hand, if some of the
obfuscated attacks were included in the training process
of the classifiers, then they were able to detect other
unknown obfuscated attacks with high performance.
From the practical point of view, we discussed require-
ments on fast retraining of classifiers, where we identi-
fied Naïve Bayes classifier with Gaussian kernels as the
most convenient one due to its capability to update the
model of a single class independently of another class,
and also it does not need to replace the feature set and
still can provide a high performance. Note that we do
not envision to use our obfuscation-aware non-payload-
based classifiers as an independent security solution but
as a complementary part of existing solutions, such as
to misuse-based and anomaly-based intrusion detection
systems that perform deep packet inspection.
In our future work, we plan to perform experiments
with existing implementations of network normalizers
as well as verify the effect of non-payload-based obfus-
cation techniques on wider spectrum of vulnerabili-
ties. Another option is to explore impact of proposed
obfuscations on communication between bots and C&C
server.
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Feature ID Description
FFS
DOL
FFS
DL
Ratio of Obfuscated
Attacks Having
Divergent Values
of a Feature
in Comparison to
Direct Attacks
Executed with
the Same Exploit
SigPktLenOut • Std. deviation of outbound (client to server) packet sizes. X X 99.44 %
MeanPktLenIn •Mean of packet sizes in inbound traffic of a connection. X X 95.01 %
CntOfOldFlows • The number of mutual connections between client and server, which
started up to 5 minutes before start of an analyzed connection.
X X 35.37 %
CntOfNewFlows • The number of mutual connections between client and server, which
started up to 5 minutes after the end of an analyzed connection.
X X 62.04 %
ModTCPHdrLen •Modus of TCP header lengths in all traffic. X 0.00 %
UrgCntIn • The number of TCP URG flags occurred in inbound traffic. X 0.00 %
FinCntIn • The number of TCP FIN flags occurred in inbound traffic. X 53.76 %
PshCntIn • The number of TCP PUSH flags occurred in inbound traffic. X 54.00 %
FourGonModulIn[1] • Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) of inbound packet sizes. The feature
represents the module of the 2nd coefficient of the FFT in goniometric
representation.
X X 95.15 %
FourGonModulOut[1] • The same as the previous one, but it represents the module of the 2nd
coefficient of the FFT for outbound traffic.
X 99.50 %
FourGonAngleOut[1] • The same as the previous one, but it represents the angle of the 2nd
coefficient of the FFT.
X 99.51 %
FourGonAngleN[9] • Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) of all packet sizes, where inbound
and outbound packets are represented by negative and positive values,
respectively. The feature represents the angle of the 10th coefficient of the
FFT in goniometric representation.
X X 99.69 %
FourGonAngleN[1] • The same as the previous one, but it represents the angle of the 2nd
coefficient of the FFT.
X 99.69%
FourGonModulN[0] • The same as the previous one, but it represents the module of the 1st
coefficient of the FFT.
X 98.80 %
PolyInd13ordOut[13] • Approximation of outbound communication by polynomial of 13th
order in the index domain of packet occurrences. The feature represents
the 14th coefficient of the approximation.
X 66.21 %
PolyInd3ordOut[3] • The same as the previous one, but it represents the 4th coefficient of the
approximation.
X 99.50 %
GaussProds8All[1] • Normalized products of all packet sizes with 8 Gaussian curves. The
feature represents a product of the 2nd slice of packets with a Gaussian
function that fits to the interval of the packets’ slice.
X 95.54 %
GaussProds8Out[7] • The same as the previous one, but computed above outbound packets
and represents a product of the 8th slice of packets with a Gaussian
function that fits to the interval of the packets’ slice.
X 52.87 %
InPktLen1s10i[5] • Lengths of inbound packets occurred in the first second of a connection,
which are distributed into 10 intervals. The feature represents totaled
outbound packet lengths of the 6th interval.
X 14.69 %
OutPktLen32s10i[3] • The same as the previous one, but computed above the first 32 seconds
of a connection. The feature represents totaled outbound packet lengths
of the 4th interval.
X 38.20 %
OutPktLen4s10i[2] • The same as the previous one, but computed above the first 4 seconds of
a connection. The feature represents totaled outbound packet lengths of
the 3rd interval.
X 35.83 %
Average of Divergent Obfuscated Attacks (FFS DL) 72.80 %
Average of Divergent Obfuscated Attacks (FFS DOL) 66.33 %Table A.1. TCP connection-level features selected by FFS (Naïve Bayes with kernels)
